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Abstract 
The paper looks into the administrative consequences of the Danish opt-
out from the common European defence policy. It focuses on the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. It is shown that in spite of 
the opt-out, a considerable Europeanization has taken place of the 
internal organization of the Danish defence administration and of the 
decision-making processes related to the ESDP. The changes in the 
Foreign Ministry are linked to Denmark’s participation in the CFSP 
whereas the Europeanization of the Defence Department is tied to the 
changes in the ESDP.  To a large extent, the Europeanization of the 
Danish defence administration is explained by decisions and actions taken 
by the civil servants involved.  
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Introduction 
Since the early 1990s and particular since the St. Malo summit in 1998, there has been a 
remarkable movement towards more cooperation among the EU member states within 
the field of security and defence (Howorth 2007; Wong 2005:134-75; Salmon 2005; 
Smith 2004; Smith 2003). There seems to be only one marked exception from the trend 
towards increased cooperation and coordination of the member states’ defence policies 
and that is Denmark. At the December 1992 Edinburgh summit, the Danish government 
was granted the possibility to opt out from the military cooperation within the 
framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In spite of the opt-out 
from the military aspects of the ESDP, Denmark has participated fully in the common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) and has been seriously committed to the 
development of all aspects of this policy, but the narrow military ones.  
In the wake of the opt-out from core elements of the ESDP, what has actually 
happened to the administrative level in the Danish defence policy in a situation where 
the other members of the Union have continued to develop common policies? Has this 
particular section of the Danish bureaucracy remained isolated from the European 
processes and therefore, has it remained unchanged in spite of the significant 
developments at the European level? Has Denmark, because of the opt-out, lost 
influence on ESDP decision-making as it has been argued by Helen Wallace would be 
the case for a country with an opt-out? (Wallace, 1997).Or have the effects in real world 
defence politics been more or less insignificant as it is indicated by recent research into 
the consequences of the opt-outs from the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)? Contrary to 
the prediction of Helen Wallace in the case of the JHA, it appears that neither Britain 
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nor Denmark have lost influence on decision-making within this particular policy field 
(Adler-Nissen, 2009: 76).  
It is the argument of the paper that contrary to the conclusions on the JHA, 
Denmark has lost and is loosing influence on decision-making within the ESDP and 
probably also within adjacent policy fields. Secondly irrespective of the opt-out from 
the military cooperation in the ESDP, it is argued that a transformation or an 
‘Europeanization’ of the Danish defence administration has taken place since the mid 
1990s. Thirdly, it is argued that the Europeanization of the defence polity has to be 
explained by actions and initiatives taken by officials involved in policy-making on the 
Danish defence policy.  
Before embarking on the empirical analysis, the following section presents the 
core concepts and the theoretical tools applied in the paper. The presentation is linked to 
an overview of the theoretical debate with the aim to locating the object of the paper. 
Also, the data and the method used in the empirical analysis are described. The 
empirical analysis starts a brief account of the Danish opt-out from the defence 
cooperation in the European Union. The analysis has three interrelated foci.  First, it 
scrutinizes the question of Danish influence on the development of the ESDP including 
the military aspects of the common defence policy. The analysis is based on a number 
interviews with officials in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) who have been engaged in the relevant processes. Secondly, the changes 
of the institutional structures and the decision-making processes related to the ESDP in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence are analysed, partly based 
on interviews. Thirdly, the actions and initiatives of the officials involved in 
administering the Danish opt-out from the ESDP are discussed. The focus on the 
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domestic administrative structures and the decision-making procedures related to the 
ESDP, implies that issues related to Danish defence ‘policy’ and Danish defence 
‘politics’ are only touched upon briefly.   
 
Concepts and analytical framework 
 
There is some research on the administrative consequences of Denmark’s participation 
in the increasing European cooperation (Christensen, 2003; Blom-Hansen & 
Christensen 2004; Kallestrup, 2005, Esmark, 2008). The general conclusion to these 
studies is a considerable adaptation has taken place but, at the same time it is also 
obvious that the Danish administrative institutions show a considerable robustness 
towards the impulses coming from Brussels. 
With its focus on the domestic impact of participation viz. non-participation in the 
European cooperation processes, the paper locates itself within the academic debate on 
Europeanization. The concept Europeanization is contested and it is often questioned if 
it, at all is useful for the study of European politics (Vink & Graziano 2008: 3ff). 
Nevertheless, the concept is increasingly popular and is being used in academic 
analyses in order to “understand how new European opportunities and constraints affect 
national politics. This new research agenda (…..) focuses on changes in national 
political systems that can be attributed to the development of European regional 
integration…...” (Vink & Graziano 2008: 3). In the paper, Europeanization of the 
administrative level is understood as a process of change in which Denmark adapts its 
administrative structures, administrative processes and decision-making processes to 
new policies, practices, norms, rules and procedures that emanate from the emerging 
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European system of governance specifically from the emerging ESDP (cf. Börzel and 
Risse 2003: 63).  
It is possible to identify two basically different approaches to the study of 
Europeanization, a bottom-up and a top-down approach. Originally, studies of 
‘Europeanization’ were preoccupied with analysing the impact of the integration 
processes at the European level, i.e. a bottom-up perspective on the creation of common 
institutions and policies (Irondelle 2003: 210; Hix 2005: 14ff; 38ff). Research on 
Europeanization did not systematically begin to focus on the domestic impact of EU 
policy until the second half of the 1990s (Knill 2001; Goetz 2000; Börzel & Risse 2003, 
Radaelli 2003). Robert Ladrech introduced the top-down approach to the study of 
Europeanization arguing that it makes sense to talk about Europeanization in situations 
where the convergence of national policy and adaptation of national public 
administration take place. Thus, adaptation is understood as an incremental process 
caused by participation in policy-making at the European level (Ladrech 1994: 69).  
In recent years, a new theoretical approach has emerged sharing the top-down 
approach to Europeanization. The new trend is called ‘cross-national policy 
convergence’ or just ‘policy convergence’ and refers to the end result of a process of 
policy change regardless of the causal circumstances (Knill 2005; Jordan 2005; 
Lenschow et al. 2005; Holzinger and Knill 2005; Knill and Lenschow 2005). Policy 
convergence is defined as “any increase in the similarity between one or more 
characteristics of a certain policy across a given set of political jurisdictions over a 
given period of time” (Knill 2005: 768). Andrew Jordan emphasizes that the policy 
convergence approach can enrich the studies of the domestic impact of Europeanization 
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by stressing that Europeanization does not necessarily cause every aspect of national 
policy to converge (Jordan 2005: 950; also Lenschow 2005).  
With its top-down approach to the administrative consequences of the opt-out, the 
study here falls within the debate on the Europeanization of foreign policy. In his 
definition of the  Europeanization of foreign policy, Ben Tonra pays special attention to 
the officials involved in policy making and to the norms and expectations tied to their 
professional roles (Tonra 2000: 229). Michael E. Smith has a similar focus on the actors 
involved in foreign policy making stressing the significance of elite socialisation, 
bureaucratic reorganization and institutional change as indicators of policy adaptation 
and administrative adaptation within the field of foreign and security policy (Smith 
2000: 617ff). Thus, both Ben Tonra and Michael Smith emphasise the crucial role of 
officials involved in decision-making and governance of the member states’ foreign 
policies vis-à-vis what goes on at the European level. As the paper applies a similar 
actor oriented approach, it is pertinent to bring forward a crucial argument of Maarten 
Vink and Paolo Graziano. The two authors strongly emphasise that Europeanization as 
such is not a theory rather, it is a phenomenon to be explained (Vink & Graziano 2008: 
12ff).   
For a number of years, there has been a debate on the role of officials in the study 
of European politics. Andrew Moravcsik maintains that government decision-makers 
can be expected to be positive towards Europeanization because it tends to keep the 
executive capacity at the national level and because “the EC provides information to 
governments that is not generally available” (Moravcsik 1993: 515). Existing research 
seems to buttress Moravcsik’s arguments (Ohrgard 1997; Smith 2000; Sjursen 2001: 
199-200). In the literature, there is general agreement that participation in the 
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collaboration within the EU on foreign policy issues has a strong socialising effect on 
the participants (Hill & Wallace 1996; Aggestam 2004). As far as national foreign 
ministries are concerned, M.E. Smith points out that “there is substantial evidence to 
show that membership….in particular influences the way individual member states 
organize their pursuit of foreign policy. Political co-operation priorities become national 
priorities…” (Smith 2000: 619).  
Even though there is this general agreement about the potential socialising effect 
of participating in the European cooperation on foreign policy issues, there is some 
disagreement on two accounts. The first concerns the strength of the socialization 
mechanism and the other is related to the extent to which the officials develop a 
European identity or they ‘only’ develop a dual identity.   
Basically, socialization is about the internationalization of norms and role 
perceptions (Quaglia et al. 2008: 157). Quaglia et al. establish that current research 
confirms the existence of a process of socialization and/or the presence of a 
supranational outlook amongst officials interacting in EU forums (Quaglia et al. 2008: 
160ff). It is confirmed by the findings of Jeffrey Lewis who stresses the significance of 
the different institutional environments to which the officials may belong (Lewis 2005; 
Lewis 2003).  The research by Jan Beyers points in the same direction even though it is 
argued that socialization is rather weak (Beyers 2005). It is the basic conclusion of 
Beyers that domestic factors and domestic institutional affiliation are more important 
than the participation in the European processes when it comes to affecting the adoption 
of supranational conceptions. “International socialization depends to a large extent on 
an in-depth exploration of how domestic politics is organized. Domestic ties are crucial”, 
it is stated (Beyers 2005: 933). The significance of the domestic environment shaping 
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the role perceptions of officials attending council working groups is stressed even 
stronger by Jan Beyers and Jarle Trondal (Beyers & Trondal, 2004). The roles and the 
perceptions of member state representatives depend to a large extent on the specific 
domestic institution to which they belong. It is argued that bureaucrats from sector 
ministries are more likely to adopt a supranational role than are the diplomats from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beyers & Trondal 2004: 928). Finally, Jeffrey Checkel 
emphasizes the importance of institutions which are described as both ‘promoters’ and 
‘sites’ of socialization. However, the socializing effects of the European institutions are 
uneven and often surprisingly weak meaning that in no way there is a development of 
new post-national identity (Checkel 2005). 
Summing up, there is widespread agreement that general socialization takes place 
of national officials participating in the working groups in the Council and in the 
Commission. There is some disagreement as to how strong is the socialization. The 
importance of the national and domestic institutions is stressed quite strongly by a 
number of authors. It points towards a conclusion that national officials develop a dual 
identity or a dual conception of their roles, but they never develop a purely ‘European 
identity’. Phrased differently, national decision-makers are not free floating individuals 
developing their norms and role perceptions in a vacuum. They are strongly influenced 
by the national institutions in which they are based. 
In conclusion, the paper focuses on the possible changes of administrative level of 
the national defence policy as a consequence of the Danish non-participation in the 
military aspects of the ESDP. It applies an actor approach to the empirical analysis. It 
assumes that the national civil servants are grounded in a socio-cultural and institutional 
context which contribute to determine their norms, roles and role expectations which in 
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the end lead to the concrete actions and initiatives the officials actually take. National 
role conceptions are supposed to influence how Danish officials involved in EU policy-
making manage, in this case, the defence opt-out. It means that the role conceptions of 
the civil servants in the MoD and the MFA and their concrete initiatives and actions are 
supposed to explain the changes of the administrative structures, administrative 
procedures and decision-making processes in the two ministerial departments 
 
Data and method  
The information used in the analysis of the Danish institutional structures, the decision-
making processes as well as the attitudes of civil servants comes from interviews carried 
out by the author in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Ministry of Defence in 
several rounds namely in August 2005, in January 2006 and November 2007. Given the 
small number of employees, it is necessary to ensure that the interviewees can not be 
identified neither by name nor by position. Therefore, when the text refers to 
information obtained in the interviews, the term ‘confidential interview’ is used.  
Semi-structured interviews were employed in which the core questions were 1) 
how is the opt-out managed on a daily basis? 2) How and in which situations have 
Danish officials to abstain from discussions potentially leading to decisions on ESDP 
issues? These two questions aimed to reveal if and how the relevant administrative 
structures and decision-making procedures have adapted to the development of the 
ESDP. 3) Does Denmark loose influence because of the opt-out? And 4) how, if at all, 
does the opt-out affect Denmark’s room for manoeuvre when general CFSP issues are 
discussed? The latter two questions aimed at revealing attitudes towards the ESDP 
among the civil servants.  
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The information on the administrative structures is buttressed by information 
obtained from a selected number of editions of ‘Ministeriernes Telefonbog’ (The 
Ministerial Directory). The information used here refers to 1996 and 2001. The 
information on 2009 is obtained from the homepages of the two departments 
(www.um.dk and www.fmn.dk). The assumption behind using the Directory in 
combination with the information from the homepages is that they can show how the 
formal institutional set-up has changed over time.  
In late 2007, the Danish government was inclined to have a number of referenda 
on the Danish opt-outs. Therefore, it was decided to ask a government research 
institution, the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) to make a White Book 
on the consequences of the opt-outs (DIIS 2008). The report is included in analysis 
when relevant. 
Defence policy is an integrated element in Denmark’s foreign policy which again 
is fully integrated into the CFSP. The integration of the different foreign policy 
instruments creates analytical problems in isolating the administrative consequences 
following from participation in the CFSP and the administrative consequences 
following from the non-participation in the military cooperation within the framework 
of the ESDP. It is not only a problem for the Danish case, it appears to be a general 
problem when dealing with the CFSP and the ESDP as “the EU input, supposed to 
generate change at the domestic level, is difficult to detect in the foreign and security 
policy area” (Major & Pomorska 2005: 2.) Likewise, Reuben Wong argues “compared 
with change in pillar I, domestic change resulting from foreign policy Europeanization 
is weaker, less clearly defined and more difficult to detect” (Wong 2008: 331; also Vink 
& Graziano 2008: 9). Irrespective of such difficulties, it is necessary for the analysis to 
10 
indicate if an Europeanization of the administrative level of Danish defence policy has 
taken place. Europeanization of the defence administration can either be the result of 
‘direct EU pressure’ or be an indirect effect of EU developments. ‘Direct EU pressure’ 
is out of the question in the Danish case because of the opt-out. Therefore, it is 
necessary to scrutinize ‘indirect effects’ which “could introduce new mechanisms such 
as diffusion or learning that is more difficult to detect” (Vink & Graziano 2008: 9ff).  
Recognizing that the effects from the European Union is much more difficult to 
detect within the fields of foreign and defence policy, Claudia Major and Claudia 
Pomorska suggest using counterfactual reasoning to establish the causal importance of 
the EU in this particular policy area (Major & Pomorska 2005: 3). The suggestion is 
followed here meaning that the analysis assumes that the possible changes would not 
have happened if Denmark did not participate in the CFSP and/or the ESDP.  
 
 
The Danish opt-out from military cooperation within the 
ESDP 
Denmark was the first EU member state to hold a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. 
A large majority in Parliament voted in favour of ratifying the Treaty. In spite of the 
clear signal from Parliament, a very small majority of 50.7 percent of the electorate on 
June 2, 1992 voted against the Union Treaty. The result came as a total surprise to the 
political establishment and to the conservative-liberal government sending chock waves 
through the political system. Leading politicians described the result as “the biggest 
crisis in Danish politics since WW 2” (Ryborg 1998: 11ff). Very soon, the government 
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succeeded in involving the opposition in finding a compromise on how to proceed with 
Denmark’s membership of the European Union. During the following months, the 
government and the opposition parties were able to establish a delicate but fragile 
compromise. It soon became known as ‘The National Compromise’ in which an opt-out 
from the defence cooperation was one of the crucial components (Ryborg 1998: 125ff).  
 At the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992, 
Denmark was granted a special opt-out from the development of a common European 
defence policy (ESDP). The central formulation in the Edinburgh treaty reads like this: 
“The heads of state and heads of government take note.... [that]... Denmark cannot 
participate in the preparation and the implementation of decisions and actions within the 
Union which affect the defence field, but Denmark will not hinder that closer 
cooperation between the member states in this field takes place”, (DUPI 2000: 230-1).  
Thus, the other member countries accepted that Denmark needed a legally binding 
arrangement in order to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. In return, Denmark had to promise 
not to obstruct any further developments should the other countries wish to deepen their 
collaboration in, for example, the field of defence policy (DUPI 2000: 230; Petersen 
2004: 514ff).   
On May 18 1993, a new referendum was held on the Maastricht Treaty which 
included the Edinburgh amendments among which were the defence opt-out. This time 
a majority of close to 57 percent voted in favour of joining the Union. With its 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Denmark agreed to participate in the development 
of a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The Parliament instructed 
the government to participate fully in the European collaboration on the CFSP and it 
also instructed the government to be highly attentive to what went on within the 
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framework of the ESDP (Folketinget 8/12 1999; 12/10 1999; 11/5 1999; 21/1 1999; 
DIIS, 2008: 60). An interesting addition to the publicly stated policy of abstaining from 
cooperation on defence came in 2004 with the new political agreement on Danish 
Defence covering the years 2005-09. The agreement reads “the political parties agree 
that the structure and the capacity of the defence forces are to be organized in ways 
which ensure that Denmark, after a possible lifting of the defence opt-out, immediately 
will be able to supply satisfactory contributions to future European defence 
tasks….”(Forsvarsministeriet 2004: 2).  
Summing up, the opt-outs granted in Edinburgh were a decisive precondition for 
maintaining a fragile political compromise on Danish membership of the European 
Union. In spite of the opt-out from the military aspects of the defence cooperation, the 
bureaucracy was instructed to follow closely the developments in the ESDP with a view 
to a possible lifting of the opt-out. The opt-out from the ESDP has been interpreted by 
successive Danish governments in a permissive way, allowing Denmark to participate 
in the debates in the Council of Ministers on motions for decisions and actions with 
implications for the defence field. In relation to the discussions on strengthening the 
European defence dimension, the government has referred to the argument that in 
principle, it is only the adoption of formal legal documents affecting the defence area 
which fall within the opt-out. Therefore, the government has participated in the 
discussions on defence issues and it has endorsed public statements within this field 
(DUPI 2000: 246). The officials have been instructed not to “participate in the 
preparation and the implementation of decision and actions within the Union which 
affect the defence field”. Therefore, Danish officials could participate in the general 
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planning of the ESDP, but they had to abstain from participating in the concrete 
implementation at the operational level (Petersen 2004: 538).  
 
 
Non-adaptation of Danish defence policy and executive 
dissociation from the opt-out 
 
With the defence opt-out, it is obvious that the Danish armed forces have been 
prevented from participating in any military operation if the European Union has been 
in charge. Because of the opt-out, Denmark did not contribute soldiers when the EU 
launched operation ‘Concordia’ in Macedonia on March 31, 2003. Neither did Denmark 
contribute soldiers to the first EU military operation outside Europe when the EU 
initiated operation ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo in July 2003. Long 
before, the European Union launched its biggest military operation deploying 7,000 
soldiers in Bosnia in December 2004, Denmark had pulled out its soldiers under NATO 
command when it became known that the EU was going to take over the NATO mission 
in the country (Petersen 2004: 461). Because of the opt-out, Denmark did not contribute 
troops to the two biggest EU operations in Africa: the 2006 EUFOR Congo and the 
2008/09 EUFOR Chad/CAR (DIIS, 2008: 103). 
From these examples, it is obvious that no ‘Europeanization’ of Danish defence 
policy has taken place. However, it is striking that the EU’s involvement in the 
Macedonia in March 2003 was supported strongly by the Danish Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen. In a public speech, he stressed that it was in the interest of Denmark 
that the EU developed its military capacity to carry out peace-enforcement operations 
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and humanitarian tasks in Europe, for example in the Western Balkans (Petersen 2004: 
239). On several occasions, the Minister of Defence, Søren Gade has directly stated that 
the opt-out means that Denmark has become isolated internationally (Folk & Forsvar, 
June 2004). Commenting on the increasing role of the EU in military crisis management 
in Africa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller, the Minister of Defence, 
Søren Gade and the Minister of Development, Ulla Tørnæs in 2008 published a joint 
feature in one of the biggest Danish newspapers. The three ministers argued “the 
operation (in Chad) is the second biggest EU crisis management operation until now. 
Unfortunately, the Danish flag will not be found in the EU force – it is prevented by the 
defence opt-out. The EU’s operation in the border area to the Sudan confirms once 
again that time has run out for the defence opt-out. …..we need a Denmark which no 
longer stands on the sideline when it comes to the EU’s military efforts. We owe 
ourselves, Europe and the third world to contribute to the EU’s important work. Totally 
without reservations”(Jyllands-Posten, February 27 2008). The DIIS report on the 
Danish opt-outs concludes “it is important to Denmark that all ESDP missions have 
been close to the officially stated Danish security and defence interests” (DIIS 2008: 
110). 
Summing up because of the opt-out, it is not possible for Denmark to participate 
in military operations, the country would have supported if for example the UN had had 
the responsibility for the implementation. At the same time, it is obvious that the 
government is strongly and explicitly against the defence opt-out and wants it lifted as 
soon as possible. 
 
Danish influence on the ESDP 
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It appears that the government is joined by the officials in the MFA and the MoD in its 
opposition to the defence opt-out. The data from the interviews in the two ministerial 
departments show a fairly unambiguous picture as far as the attitudes and the role 
perceptions of the officials are concerned. The evaluation of the opt-out is generally 
negative and it is clearly stressed that it is perceived as an obstacle to exerting Danish 
influence both on the CFSP in general and on the ESDP in particular. MFA officials 
state “we are not interesting to our partners we are less attractive which limits our 
possibilities for exerting influence” (confidential interview). “Participation in the 
discussions leading to decisions is extremely important. It is important for us to join the 
discussion at the earliest possible point in time” (confidential interview). If possible, the 
frustration is even stronger in the MoD: “We are obliged to be attentive towards every 
change and development in the ESDP. We have to participate in meetings and in 
committees but we are not taken seriously. Our market value vis-à-vis the other EU 
countries is very limited.…..As a bureaucracy we are paralysed” (confidential 
interview).  
 The civil servants working with ESDP issues in the MFA feel they can not 
be proactive and they cannot seek influence on decision-making on defence in Brussels. 
Instead, they are mainly preoccupied with managing the Danish opt-out from the ESDP. 
The officials follow closely any new developments, changes or just plain rumours of 
potential initiatives to be launched within the framework of the ESDP. This type of 
activity is basically about information gathering. Also, a lot of time is spent finding the 
legal limits to the Danish involvement in the ESDP (confidential interview). Because of 
the restrictions on the Danish civil servants working on ESDP related issues, they have 
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to ‘compensate’ by being much more constructive and much more proactive in related 
fields. In particular, Denmark is active in promoting issues linked to the civilian 
components of the ESDP and on the development of concepts on civilian operations 
within the ESDP (Jacobsen 2009). The compensatory behaviour on ESDP related issues 
is considered as a simple necessity in order to maintain Denmark’s position as a 
credible partner within the CFSP in general (confidential interview).  
Given its current status, Denmark is not a very interesting partner for the other EU 
members when narrow defence and pure military issues are up for discussion therefore 
the MoD has to spend a considerable amount of time on information gathering.  
Because Denmark does not participate in the development of the EU battle groups, it 
has great difficulties in obtaining the relevant information. Because of the opt-out, 
Denmark simply lacks the contacts and the personal networks that make it ‘natural’ and 
therefore less time consuming to exchange views and evaluations with Copenhagen on 
policy issues where the other members know that Denmark has to abstain from 
participating (confidential interview).  
Based on the interviews and the brief quotations above, it is obvious that the 
officials involved in discussions and policy formulations on ESDP related issues are 
strongly in favour of lifting the opt-out. The reason for being against the opt-out is clear 
and unambiguous. It is the perception that the opt-out prohibits Danish civil servants 
from exerting influence and from taking care of what they perceive as Danish national 
interests. From the interviews, it is fairly clear that the officials share a common 
understanding that Denmark’s future possibilities to exert international leverage are tied 
to being an active partner in the European Union. “The CFSP is much more important 
than it was 10 years ago. Increasingly, the CFSP is the forum for common policy 
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formulations and decisions not only within foreign policy in general but also within 
security and defence issues” (confidential interview). 
In summary based on the interviews and buttressed by the DIIS report published 
in 2008 on the Danish opt-outs (DIIS 2008: 119ff), it is safe to conclude that Denmark 
has very limited influence on the development of the ESDP. Such a conclusion is in 
agreement with the old argument of Helen Wallace (Wallace1997). It is hardly 
surprising as lack of influence was an acknowledged consequence of the opt-out. On the 
other hand, the conclusion is contrary to the observations of Adler-Nissen who states 
that the British and Danish opt-outs do not restrict the influence of the two countries 
within the field of the JHA (Adler-Nissen 2009). 
 
Transformation of the administrative structures and policy-
making processes in the defence administration 
 
This section aims at showing that a conspicuous Europeanization has taken place of the 
Danish national administration involved in defence policy. The section scrutinizes the 
organizational changes that have taken place in the two ministries involved in 
administering Danish defence policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD). Governments in Denmark do not interfere in the internal 
organisation of public administration which is strictly a bureaucratic responsibility. It is 
the responsibility of the permanent secretary in each ministry to decide the specific 
organisation of units, sections and divisions, they find most appropriate.  
In the years following 1993 and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP 
became an integral part of Denmark’s foreign policy. The crucial position of the EU in 
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Denmark’s general foreign policy is obvious from Denmark’s active participation in the 
debates on European foreign policy and from the attempts to coordinate foreign policy 
initiatives among the member states (Larsen 2005: 201-208; Petersen 2004). Danish 
civil servants participate in the activities of some 30 working groups in Brussels dealing 
with the CFSP including all groups addressing defence issues except one, the European 
Defence Agency. It seems to be a guiding principle for the civil servants involved in the 
working groups that they endeavour to play a positive and constructive role in the 
debates on all issues which are on the table. The Danish civil servants make an effort to 
play a similar role in the preparatory phase before topics are officially tabled 
(confidential interviews).  
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a reorganisation took place as of April 1, 2009. 
In the so-called North division which is involved in implementing Danish foreign policy 
towards the developed world including Russia and the Caucasus, the European Union 
receives a significant amount of attention in the internal organisational set-up 
(www.um.da/omOs/organisation/organigram/Nordgruppen/accessed 07.04.09). It is 
worth mentioning that an ambassador holds the position as Head of ‘European Affairs’. 
In the internal hierarchy, the position is located at the same level as the Head of 
‘Political affairs’ and the Head of the ‘Legal service’. Out of nine sections in the North 
division, no less than four are directly involved in European Union issues. For the 
discussion here it is of particular importance that a fifth section works with ‘security 
policy’ which includes European security. In the section dealing with ‘security policy’, 
a limited number of civil servants work full time with topics related to the ESDP 
constantly considering the reports coming from the Danish participants in the working 
groups in Brussels (confidential interview). Based on this information, the internal 
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organization of the MFA has clearly adapted to the development of the CFSP including 
the ESDP.  
Within the realm of the Ministry of Defence, an almost identical picture can be 
observed as of spring 2009. Basically only one section is involved in policy-making on 
the EU and on the ESDP. It is the ‘NATO & EU section’ within the division on 
‘Strategy and policy’ 
(www.fmn.dk/Departmentet/Organisation/Pages/nyorganisation.aspx, accessed 
15.04.09). It is highly interesting to note that the MoD has allocated almost as much 
manpower to take care of Denmark’s relationship to the ESDP as the Ministry has 
allocated to take care of Danish interests in relation to NATO’s defence planning 
(confidential interview). The lack of Danish participation in concrete ESDP operations 
does not, however, keep the officials from the MoD from participating in the debates on 
these issues. As in the MFA, MoD officials deliberately keep a low profile in the 
different working groups because they constantly have to keep a close eye on the 
limitations that follow from the opt-out (confidential interview). 
Based on the above, it is safe to conclude as of spring 2009, the national 
institutional structures and the policy-making processes within the realm of the MFA 
and the MoD have adapted to what goes on at the European level concerning the ESDP. 
However, it is necessary to trace the changes in the administrative set-up over time in 
order to substantiate or ‘test’ the argument that a Europeanization has taken place.  
As far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is concerned, the position of the 
European Union appears to have changed quite significantly from the mid 1990s to 
2001. Back in 1996, two sections out of six were totally pre-occupied with European 
Union issues whereas bilateral foreign relations appear to be the predominant purpose of 
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the remaining sections. In that year, Denmark’s relationship to the West European 
Union is hardly found in the organisational set-up of the MFA whereas general security 
issues, NATO relations as well as the UN and peacekeeping operations seem to be the 
big issues that required much attention in the mid 1990s. Compared with the 1996 
situation, the EU takes up a very significant position both in 2001and in 2009, 
irrespective of the different names of the sections in the North division. It has to be 
mentioned that in 2001, one sub-section was directly focussed on the CFSP and the 
ESDP. Also, it is interesting to note that in 2001, the number of staff dealing with EU 
security and defence issues was more or less equivalent to the number of staff working 
on NATO issues namely around four. A comparison between the administrative set-up 
in 1996 and 2001 reveals that the changes were quite conspicuous meaning that by the 
mid 1990s, the MFA had not yet adopted its organisational structure to the Danish full 
participation in the CFSP. However, by 2001 it was obvious from the administrative 
organisation of the North division of the Danish MFA that the EU was a pivotal point 
for Danish foreign policy.  
As far as the 2001 organisational set-up of the Ministry of Defence is concerned, it 
is impossible to identify the European Union not to talk about the ESDP as topics that 
was officially given attention in the Ministry at that time.  Looking at the situation in 
1996, it is interesting to note that one section dealt with ‘security policy and 
international issues – NATO’ emphasizing Denmark’s core security organisation. 
(Ministeriernes Telefonbog 1996/2). 
Summing up, the institutional structures of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
as well as the decision-making processes have adapted to what goes on at the European 
level concerning the ESDP. In particular, it was clearly the case in 2001. As far as the 
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Ministry of Defence is concerned, it appears that the 2009 institutional structure has 
adapted to the fact that the ESDP has developed significantly in recent years. The civil 
servants participate in the European policy-making processes not only on foreign and 
security issues, but certainly also on numerous aspects of defence policy except those 
related to the implementation of concrete operational plans and to the European Defence 
Agency. However, neither in the 2001 nor in the 1996 organisation, a similar visible 
position can be observed of the EU in relation to Danish defence administration.  
Having concluded that organisational changes as well as changes of the decision-
making procedures have taken place in both ministries, the question remains if these 
transformations can be explained with reference to the ESDP or they have to be 
explained by Denmark’s active involvement in the CFSP. The significant changes that 
took place in the MFA between 1996 and 2001 most probably have to be explained by 
Denmark’s full and active membership of the CFSP which followed the adoption of the 
Union Treaty. Probably, it only required minor changes to adapt to the significant 
developments of the ESDP in the wake of the 1998 St. Malo summit. The situation 
seems different when it comes to the MoD. Apparently, what went on within the ESDP 
during the 1990s and early 2000s was not considered important to the Defence 
department. On the other hand, it is possible to show that from the situation in 2001 
until the 2009 organisational set-up, the EU has achieved a much more conspicuous 
position. The MoD is for obvious reasons focussed on defence issues and much less on 
general CFSP topics. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that the organisation and the 
decision-making procedures of this particular Ministry changed during the current 
decade because of the developments of the ESDP.   
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In conclusion, it can be argued that the administrative structures and the decision-
making procedures in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been Europeanized since the 
mid-1990s and also that it to a very large extent due is to Denmark’s full membership of 
the CFSP. In the Defence department, it appears that the organisational and decision-
making changes have been Europeanized because of the recent significant developments 
of the ESDP which have taken place since the early years of this century.  
 
The role of Danish officials working with ESDP related issues 
 
The previous section showed that in spite of the opt-out from military cooperation 
within the ESDP, the administrative level of the Danish defence policy has been 
Europeanized. It is the core argument of the paper that this change has to be explained 
with reference to actions and initiatives taken by officials based in the two ministries. 
No doubt, Danish officials are based in an administrative system which is strongly 
Europeanized in all policy fields and thus generally organized to facilitate Denmark’s 
participation in the European integration processes (Blom-Hansen & Christensen, 2004; 
Christensen 2003). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Rebecca Adler-Nissen can 
point out that “the current consensus among broad parts of the political and 
administrative élite in Denmark is that the opt-outs are a nuisance” (Adler-Nissen 2009: 
73).  
Based on thorough empirical studies, Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen 
concludes that since Denmark became a member of the European Community in 1972, a 
significant adaptation of Danish public administration has taken place. “(The adaptation) 
basically shows a considerable flexibility and attentive attitude in Danish public 
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administration. Therefore, routines and institutional rules of game have developed 
generally solving the tasks following from the participation (in EU cooperation) ….In 
no way, it has meant passivity from the officials in the central administration” 
(Christensen 2003: 93). It is the argument of Grønnegaard Christensen that in general, 
public administrative institutions undertake new and bigger tasks without resisting a 
potential growth of their workload. Such a behaviour is to be explained by the strong 
norm of loyalty which is an integrated element of the ethics of modern bureaucracies. 
Also, it has to be acknowledged that the officials are interested in the greater power and 
prestige which follow from an increasing number of tasks and new functions which, 
next give them a stronger position in the internal bureaucratic struggle about resources 
which is so decisive for the future career of the individual official (Christensen 2003: 
60ff).   
The interviews and observations made by the author in the Danish MFA and in the 
MoD make it possible to establish that officials based in the two ministerial departments 
hold strongly positive attitudes towards participating and cooperating in the European 
Union within their specific fields. It is worth stressing that all the interviewees express 
the opinion that participating fully and without any restrictions in the ESDP is the best 
way to take care of what they perceive as Danish foreign and security interests. It is 
obvious to argue that the frustration and the role conflict they might experience tend to 
push them in favour of an organisational set-up which adapts to what goes on at the 
European level. Closely linked to this, it can be expected that the officials are interested 
in every organisational change which improve their possibilities for participating in the 
decision-making processes in Brussels.  
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In conclusion, the openly expressed interests of the officials combined with the 
request of the Parliament to follow closely what goes on within the ESDP can explain 
the changes of the organisational set-up and the decision-making procedures in the 
MFA and the MoD. As a consequence of the Europeanization of the Danish defence 
administration, Denmark is ready to join the ESDP as a full member from day one, 
should the opt-out be lifted. It is only narrow political considerations including political 
uncertainty as regards the behaviour of the voters that prevents the government to call a 
referendum on lifting the defence opt-out.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Denmark is the only EU member country which does not participate fully in the 
development of the European Security and Defence Policy. It is the reason for the paper 
to ask the question what has happened to this particular policy field in a situation where 
the other member states have developed common policies? First, it is concluded that 
Denmark has very limited influence on this particular policy field. It may not be 
surprising even though a recent analysis of the consequences of the Danish and British 
opt-outs from the JHA points in a different direction. 
 The main focus of the paper has been on the administrative level of the 
Danish defence policy. The paper concludes rather unambiguously that a 
Europeanization has taken place of the administrative structures and of the decision-
making procedures both within the MFA and the MoD. Europeanization is defined as a 
process in which Denmark adapts its administrative structures and decision-making 
processes to the new policies, practices and procedures that come from the development 
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of ESDP. However, there is a difference between the two ministerial departments as far 
as the time and the speed of the Europeanization processes are concerned. It appears 
that the Europeanization processes took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as early 
as during the 1990s. As far as the Ministry of Defence is concerned, the 
Europeanization did not manifest itself until the years following the 2001.  
 The changes that have taken place within the MFA are most probably to 
be explained by Denmark’s full membership of the CFSP.  On the other hand, the 
changes of the organisation and decision-making processes of the MoD most probably 
can be explained as adaptation to the significant developments of the ESDP which has 
been conspicuous in the current millennium. 
 Finally, it is concluded that the Europeanization of the Danish defence 
administration can only be explained by referring to the initiatives and actions of the 
civil servants based in the two ministries. Such a conclusion is in agreement with the 
literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy. The literature as well as empirical 
studies of the Europeanization of the Danish public administration in general point to 
the significance of the domestic institutions involved. There is no doubt that the Danish 
civil service in general is very positive towards the cooperation taking placed within the 
European Union. Moreover, it is important that Danish public administrative institutions 
have shown a considerable flexibility and adaptive capability when it comes to the 
European cooperation.  
 Summing up, in spite Denmark has an opt-out from core aspects of the 
ESDP, the Danish administrative structures and decision-making processes have 
adapted to the new policies, practices and procedures which would be necessary if the 
country participated fully in the ESDP. The Europeanization has taken place because of 
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bureaucratic actions and initiatives and it has taken place even though, there is an 
explicit political decision that Denmark does not participate in the military cooperation 
within the ESDP. It appears the transformation has taken place because the officials 
involved felt that they, as civil servants, were without influence and therefore Denmark 
lost influence on the development of the ESDP and possibly also in adjacent policy 
fields. 
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